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Corporate Law Bulletin

Bulletin No. 74, October 2003

Editor: Professor Ian Ramsay, Director, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation

Published by LAWLEX on behalf of Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation, Faculty of Law, the University of Melbourne with the support of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Australian Stock Exchange and the leading law firms: Blake Dawson Waldron, Clayton Utz, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, Freehills, Mallesons Stephen Jaques, Phillips Fox.

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Brief Contents
1. Recent Corporate Law and Corporate Governance Developments

2. Recent ASIC Developments

3. Recent ASX Developments

4. Recent Takeovers Panel

5. Recent Corporate Law Decisions

6. Contributions

 

7. Subscription

8. Change of Email Address

9. Website Version

10. Copyright

11. Disclaimer

Detailed Contents

1. Recent Corporate Law and Corporate Governance Developments

1.1 Ministerial Review Panel report on restoration of confidence in accounting in South Africa
1.2 IFAC and International Regulators propose reforms to strengthen audit quality
1.3 Consultation on EU Financial Conglomerates Directive
1.4 First RepuTex social responsibility ratings announced
1.5 SEC Chairman releases statement regarding late trading and market timing of mutual funds
1.6 CLERP 9 draft legislation released
1.7 SEC proposes rules to increase proxy access by shareholders
1.8 Board Proposes Auditing Standards for Internal Control over Financial Reporting
1.9 UK boardrooms already responding to the Combined Code
1.10 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds report
1.11 Shareholders' rights in DLCs
1.12 SEC Issues Policy Statement on Business Continuity Planning for Trading Markets
1.13 Independent Directors Crucial to Corporate Governance: Hong Kong report
1.14 UK House of Commons Trade and Industry report: Rewards for Failure
1.15 Study finds empirical evidence of a correlation between corporate risk quality and financial performance
1.16 CBI unveils guidelines on severance packages
1.17 New US survey shows Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased effectiveness of audit committees and corporate governance
1.18 Corporate Law Judgments Milestone
1.19 Study of voting levels in UK companies

2. Recent ASIC Developments

2.1 ASIC class order provides relief to allow multi-issuer PDS
2.2 Amended Pro Forma 209: AFS licence conditions
2.3 ASIC releases version 4 of eLicensing and AFS licensing kit
2.4 ASIC provides overview of applications for relief under FSRA
2.5 Guide for AFS licensees on compliance
2.6 ASIC provides limited relief for certain foreign financial services
2.7 Additional guidance for FSR relief applications
2.8 Amendment to ASIC Policy Statement 166 Financial requirements - foreign exchange dealers

3. Recent ASX Developments

3.1 ASX calls for comment on proposed Listing Rule amendments
3.2 Implementation Review Group
3.3 ASXSR Annual Report 2003

4. Recent Takeovers Panel Matters

4.1 Prudential Investment Company of Australia Limited - Panel sets aside ASIC decision
4.2 Conclusion of proceedings relating to National Can Industries Limited
4.3 Grand Hotel Group: Panel declines to commence proceedings
4.4 Listed trust and managed investment scheme mergers: Panel releases draft guidance note
4.5 Selwyn Mines Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) - Panel Declines Application

5. Recent Corporate Law Decisions

5.1 Constitutionality and exhaustiveness of the compulsory acquisition provisions of the Corporations Act
5.2 Contravention of the Corporations Act did not invalidate resolutions of shareholders and creditors for the voluntary winding up of a company as the contravention caused no substantial injustice
5.3 Abuse of voluntary administration provisions
5.4 Minimum subscription requirements for managed investment schemes
5.5 AAT amends ASIC's decision to prohibit a company from relying on the special prospectus content rules
5.6 Reinstatement of deregistered company - issues arising under the Workers Compensation Act
5.7 Non-fulfilment of conditions under an order setting aside a statutory demand
5.8 Fiduciary and statutory duties of resigning directors
5.9 Trading under a Deed of Company Arrangement without warning the public
5.10 Liability of a principal (licensed securities dealer) for an agent's representations
5.11 Court rewrites "oppressive" constitution

6. Contributions

7. Subscription

8. Change of Email Address

9. Website Version

10. Copyright

11. Disclaimer

1. Recent Corporate Law and Corporate Governance Developments
1.1 Ministerial Review Panel report on restoration of confidence in accounting in South Africa

Mr Trevor Manuel, the Minister of Finance of South Africa, appointed a Ministerial Review Panel early in 2003 to assist in the restoration of public confidence and trust in the areas of financial reporting and auditing. On 22 October the Panel released its report detailing recommendations relating to various corporate governance issues, audit control measures, disclosure issues and training of chartered accountants.

A summary of the report of the panel can be found at: 
http://www.saica.co.za/documents/MINISTERIAL_PANEL.pdf


1.2 IFAC and International Regulators propose reforms to strengthen audit quality

The international accountancy profession, together with international regulators, have published reforms to improve the quality of standards and practices in auditing and assurance worldwide and to achieve global convergence of high quality standards. Their focus is on strengthening the international auditing and assurance standards process to bolster public confidence in the work of auditors and in the financial reporting process.

The reforms are described in a paper entitled "Proposals for Reform," released on 22 October 2003 and developed by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and international regulators with input from IFAC member organizations, regional accountancy organizations and the profession at large. IFAC's Board will present the reform proposals to its Council for approval in November 2003.

The objective of the reforms, which are expected to be implemented in early 2004, is to help ensure that IFAC's standard-setting activities reflect the public interest and are consistent with the priorities of the international regulatory community. Key aspects of the reform proposals include the development of a more transparent standard- setting process, particularly with respect to audit and assurance standards, and the provision for greater public and regulatory input into that process. In addition, the proposals call for the establishment of a Public Interest Oversight Board (PIOB) to oversee IFAC's public- interest activities. Members of the PIOB will be selected by the regulatory community.

Regulatory and other international groups involved in the development of the proposals include the International Organization for Securities Commissions (IOSCO), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, European Commission, World Bank, and International Association of Insurance Supervisors, as well as the Financial Stability Forum, which strives to promote international financial stability and improve the functioning of markets.

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) recently reported that it "strongly supports IFAC's efforts" to reform its public- interest activities, including the formation of a Public Interest Oversight Board. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) also indicated its support of the reform proposals, which they view as a positive step in ensuring that the international auditing standard-setting process is responsive to the public interest.

The PIOB will comprise 10 members and will focus on IFAC standard-setting activities related to audit and assurance services, independence and other ethics standards. It will also oversee the education standard-setting process and IFAC's member body compliance program.

The reform proposals also include recommendations for strengthening and enhancing the transparency of IFAC's governance, expanding the role of Consultative Advisory Groups in standard-setting processes, and formalizing ongoing collaboration between regulators and IFAC to ensure the efficacy of the reforms.

The paper is on the IFAC website.


1.3 Consultation on EU Financial Conglomerates Directive

On 22 October 2003, the United Kingdom's Treasury and Financial Services Authority jointly published a consultation paper with the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority on the proposed EU Financial Conglomerates Directive.

The Directive requires that prudential supervision for companies which straddle the insurance, banking and investment sectors be applied by a single supervisory co-ordinator.

Announcing the publication Financial Secretary Ruth Kelly said:

"This Directive is a key element in the Financial Service Action Plan and is necessary to ensure that the supervision of corporate groups takes full account of the group as a whole and the individual firms which comprise it. I hope all those with an interest participate in the consultation process."

The consultation paper is on the FSA website.


1.4 First RepuTex social responsibility ratings announced

On 13 October 2003, a new annual social responsibility rating of Australia's top 100 companies was released by Reputation Measurement. The rating is called RepuTex. Companies were assessed by 19 community groups in four areas, Corporate Governance, Environmental Impact, Social Impact, and Workplace Practices. The RepuTex Rating Committee oversees the process and comments on the findings.

The main results of the rating are:

  • 54 companies were satisfactory or better
  • 36 companies were not satisfactory
  • 9 were not rated due to insufficient information (1 company was exempt)
  • One company received the "outstanding" rating of AAA, Westpac.
  • 10 companies received the "high" AA rating: (in order from 2nd to 11th) IBM Australia, Energex, Australian Postal Corporation, Shell Australia, Alcoa of Australia, Visy Industries, Queensland Rail, BHP Billiton, Coca-Cola Amatil (Australia), Insurance Australia Group.
  • The best-performing sectors were mining/metals, utilities, energy, and transport.

Areas of concern

  • 86 companies were not satisfactory in the Environmental Impact category, 12 companies were satisfactory or better.
  • The Insurance sector as a group was not satisfactory in the Corporate Governance category.

RepuTex will be an annual rating. The full 2003 RepuTex Rating results are published at http://www.reputationmeasurement.com.au

(a) RepuTex ratings results and main findings

Categories: Overall, Corporate Governance, Environmental Impact, Social Impact, Workplace Practices

AAA=Outstanding
AA=High
A=Satisfactory
B=Low
C=Very Low
D=Inadequate

(i) Company Performance

  • 99 companies assessed by the 19 groups (1 company was exempt):
  • 54 companies were satisfactory or better
  • 36 companies were not satisfactory
  • 9 companies were not rated because of insufficient information
  • One company, Westpac, received the "outstanding" AAA rating. This rating is consistent with Westpac topping its sector globally in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index.
  • 10 companies received the "high" AA rating: (in order from 2nd to 11th) IBM Australia, Energex, Australian Postal Corporation, Shell Australia, Alcoa of Australia, Visy Industries, Queensland Rail, BHP Billiton, Coca-Cola Amatil (Australia), Insurance Australia Group.
  • The mining/metals, energy, and transport companies were the best performing companies overall
  • The strongest category result was in Corporate Governance; 78 companies were satisfactory or better, 17 were not satisfactory, 4 were not assessed due to insufficient information.
  • The weakest category result was in Environmental Impact; 12 companies were satisfactory or better, 86 were not satisfactory, 1 was not rated due to insufficient information.

(ii) Company Type Performance (Public/Private/Govemment-owned subsidiaries of MNC)

  • Government-owned corporations were, overall, the most socially responsible. As a group, they were top in all four categories. Australian Postal Corporation topped two categories. The next best group was local subsidiaries of overseas-listed multinationals. The third and last group was local ASX-listed companies. Private companies were not compared as a group due to insufficient information.

(iii) Industry Sector Performance

Of the 14 industry sectors:

  • Nine sectors were satisfactory or better overall; five sectors were not satisfactory overall.
  • Metals & Mining was the most socially responsible sector, closely followed by Utilities.
  • Media & Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure and Health Care & Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology were consistently poor performing across all four categories and overall.
  • The strongest sector result was in Corporate Governance; 13 sectors were satisfactory or better, one sector, Insurance, was not satisfactory.
  • The weakest sector result was in Environment Impact; all 14 sectors were not satisfactory.

(iv) Main Conclusions

  • The corporate social responsibility (csr) agenda is significantly more advanced in the UK, Europe, USA and Canada than in Australia, but there are signs locally that it is solid in several industry sectors and progressing in most sectors.
  • Of the four categories assessed, companies are most active and advanced in addressing corporate governance, reflecting the implementation of recent measures to strengthen this area. Companies overall are least active and advanced in addressing Environmental Impact.
  • Heavy industrials are the strongest performing sectors in Australia (Metals & Mining, Utilities, Transport). These sectors have demonstrated considerable responsiveness to the concerns of stakeholders and the wider community and have improved the quality of their reporting on a range of social, environmental, workplace and governance issues. These sectors, which have some of the greatest liabilities and risks, are the ones moving most rapidly towards ensuring their operations are economically, socially and environmentally sustainable.
  • Of the other sectors, Insurance Australia Group and IBM are clearly leading their industry sectors (the Insurance and Diversified Telecommunication Services and Technology sectors respectively).
  • Media & Hotels, Restaurants & Leisure and Health Care & Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology are clearly the two worst performing sectors. Within these two sectors there does not appear to be any demonstrable awareness of social responsibility management and reporting. There is little evidence of these companies formulating individual social responsibility policies and plans.
  • Ownership type of companies has emerged as a factor in social responsibility performance, with government-owned corporations outperforming local subsidiaries of overseas-listed multinationals and ASX-listed companies in all four categories and overall. A significant number of local ASX companies must lift their performance to meet local and international standards.
  • Given the collapse of HIH, the Insurance sector's "not satisfactory" result in Corporate Governance is concerning and may require further investigation.

(b) Comments by RepuTex

The inaugural RepuTex Ratings provide some insight into the current levels of acceptance of the social responsibility agenda within the Australian business community. The strong performance of government corporations reflects the degree of accountability and transparency required of government authorities and the more direct link between these organisations and their community stakeholders. Their good result contradicts the often-held view of the public sector as slow to uptake important global developments and standards of business best practice.

The relatively strong performance of local subsidiaries of overseas-listed multinationals, whilst not uniform across this group, is clearly related to the more mature nature of the csr agenda in the UK, Europe and North America. The recently released investigation into corporate sustainability in Australia, the Mays Report (Department of Environment and Heritage, September, 2003), made comment on the nascent nature of csr within the Australian market in comparison with our European and North American counterparts. Whilst some high-profile Australian organisations are still yet to prioritise csr principles, reporting and stakeholder engagement, developments internationally demonstrate the manner in which this agenda has been accepted and incorporated into mainstream business operations.

In the UK the tabling of the Corporate Responsibility (CORE) Bill in September of this year follows more than 300 MPs expressing support for comprehensive laws promoting greater corporate accountability. The CORE Bill incorporates provisions for mandatory social reporting for all large UK organisations, compulsory stakeholder engagement and expanding the duties and responsibilities of Directors to incorporate social and environmental factors as well as financial considerations. Several European countries including France, the Netherlands and Denmark already have legislation requiring organisations to produce social as well as financial reports. This growing trend of greater corporate accountability and transparency has also received much attention in North America following the Enron and WorldCom collapses, which precipitated the rapid reform of the Corporate Corruption Bill (Sarbanes /Oxley).

By comparison the Australian market has not reacted as swiftly to such developments. While there is a general level of awareness and acceptance of corporate social responsibility many Australian organisations rated by RepuTex in 2003 are only beginning to prioritise social responsibility issues. One area where good progress has been made is in corporate governance. The recent release of new Australian Stock Exchange corporate governance guidelines has generated significant change and development within this area in 2003.

The RepuTex 2003 Ratings indicate that the most progressive ASX-listed organisations in terms of their public disclosure and community accountability are by and large those in the highest impact sectors. Heavy industrial, manufacturing and mining organisations have traditionally been subject to the highest level of scrutiny regarding their social and environmental impacts. Whilst these organisations continue to have significant impacts associated with their operations it is apparent that many have moved to integrate community concerns about these impacts into a new framework of operating. This has engendered a culture of greater accountability, transparency and responsibility. This transformation is represented in the 2003 RepuTex Ratings with two large mining organisations, Alcoa of Australia and BHP Billiton, receiving AA ratings, and a further five heavy industrial organisations, BHP Steel, Newmont Australia, Rio Tinto, Amcor and Boral listed in the top 20 performers overall.


1.5 SEC Chairman releases statement regarding late trading and market timing of mutual funds

On 9 October 2003 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman William H. Donaldson issued the following statement:

"Recent allegations regarding the sale of mutual fund shares point to abuses in connection with late trading and market timing of fund shares. Our staff is aggressively investigating these allegations and is committed to holding those responsible for violating the federal securities laws accountable and seeking restitution for mutual fund investors that have been harmed by these abuses.

It is clear from information developed thus far that there are additional regulatory actions that the Commission should consider in seeking to eliminate or significantly curb late trading and market timing abuses in the future. Consequently, I have asked our staff to prepare rulemaking initiatives to address these issues for Commission consideration no later than next month. Specifically, these initiatives include the following:

(a) Late trading

The staff is considering new rules and rule amendments designed to prevent late trading abuses.

  • These amendments would be designed to prevent the circumvention of forward-pricing requirements for purchases and redemptions of fund shares. In preparing one possible amendment, the staff is examining the feasibility of requiring that the fund (rather than an intermediary such as a broker-dealer or other unregulated third party) must receive the order prior to the time the fund prices its shares for an investor to receive that day's price. For most funds, this would mean that the fund would have to receive the order by approximately 4:00 p.m. for the investor to receive that day's price. This would effectively eliminate the potential for late trading through intermediaries that sell fund shares.
  • The amendments being considered by the staff also would require funds to have additional procedures and controls in place to prevent late trading and ensure compliance with the new pricing requirements.

(b) Market timing

The staff also is considering new rules and form amendments that would curb market timing abuses, including rules and form amendments that would:

  • require explicit disclosure in fund offering documents of market timing policies and procedures;
  • require funds to have procedures to comply with representations regarding market timing policies and procedures;
  • emphasize the obligation of funds to fair value their securities under certain circumstances to minimize market timing arbitrage opportunities; and
  • reinforce the obligation of fund directors to consider the adequacy and effectiveness of fund market timing practices and procedures.

These are not the only measures under consideration. I have asked the staff to consider whether funds should have additional tools to thwart market timing activity and whether additional requirements are necessary to reinforce funds' and advisers' obligations to comply with their fiduciary duties and to prevent the misuse of material, non-public information, including the selective disclosure of portfolio holdings information. As is the SEC's traditional practice, the staff's recommendations will be presented to the Commission and, if approved, will be published for public comment."


1.6 CLERP 9 draft legislation released

On 8 October 2003, the Treasurer released the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Bill and accompanying commentary for public consultation.

The draft Bill generally implements the reforms proposed in the CLERP 9 policy proposal paper (September 2002) and also reflects the outcome of consultations undertaken since the paper's release.

In addition, the draft Bill incorporates recommendations of the Ramsay Report (Independence of Australian Company Auditors), the report of the HIH Royal Commission, and takes account of relevant recommendations of the report of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit (Report 391 Review of Independent Auditing by Registered Company Auditors).

The Government is seeking comments from business and the community to ensure that the reforms are effective and achieve optimum outcomes for shareholders and investors. The Bill is intended to be introduced into Parliament in December with commencement from 1 July 2004.

Comments on the draft Bill should be sent by 10 November 2003 to:

The General Manager
Corporations and Financial Services Division
Department of the Treasury
Langton Crescent
PARKES ACT 2600

Copies of the Bill and commentary are available at http://www.treasurer.gov.au or from the Treasury Website.

Key features of the bill are outlined below:

(a) Audit oversight arrangements

  • The Financial Reporting Council's (FRC) role will be expanded to include oversight of the audit standard setting arrangements. The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB) will be reconstituted with a Government appointed Chairman under the oversight of the FRC, similar to the Australian Accounting Standards Board. Auditing standards made by the AUASB will be given legislative backing.
    • CLERP 9 originally proposed that only 'core' auditing standards be given legislative backing. However, given the views of stakeholders and ASIC that it is not possible to identify a selection of auditing standards that encompass the key issues that are applicable to Corporations Act audits, all standards will have legal backing.
  • The FRC will also have an oversight and monitoring function in relation to auditor independence. This role will include advising the Minister on the nature and overall adequacy of the systems and processes used by:
    • auditors to ensure compliance with independence requirements; and
    • professional accounting bodies for planning and performing quality assurance reviews of audit work.

(b) Auditor independence

  • The Bill contains a range of measures to enhance auditor independence including:
    • Introduction of a general standard of independence and a requirement that auditors provide directors with an annual declaration that they have maintained their independence.
    • Restrictions on specific employment and financial relationships between auditors and their clients.
    • Restrictions on particular persons joining the audited body as an officer. In this respect the Bill will implement the recommendations of the HIH Royal Commission report:
      • A waiting period of 4 years will apply to partners of an audit firm or directors of an audit company directly involved in the audit of the audited body.
      • A waiting period of 2 years will apply to partners of an audit firm or directors of an audit client not directly involved in the audit of the audited body.
      • A waiting period of 4 years will apply to a professional member of an audit team in relation to the audit of the audited body.
    • Mandatory auditor rotation after 5 consecutive years with a 2 year cooling off period before a person who has played a 'significant role' in the audit can be reassigned to that audited body.
      • In light of concerns surrounding the impact of this requirement on smaller audit firms and those operating in rural and regional areas, the original CLERP 9 proposal has been modified to allow ASIC to extend the period after which rotation is required to up to 7 consecutive years.
    • A requirement for listed companies to disclose in their annual directors' report the fees paid to the auditor for each non-audit service, as well as a description of the service. In addition, the annual directors' report of each listed company must include a statement by directors that they are satisfied that the provision of non-audit services does not compromise independence.
      • CLERP 9 originally proposed that disclosure regarding non-audit services be made in relation to 9 specified categories of non-audit services. This requirement has been changed to reflect the recommendations of the HIH Royal Commission report.
    • A requirement that the lead engagement auditor (or a suitably qualified representative) attend the AGM of a listed client when the auditor's report on the financial statements is tabled and answer questions relevant to the audit.

(c) Proportionate liability and incorporation of audit firms

  • The Bill implements a proportionate liability regime in respect of economic loss or damage to property. This regime is part of a broader framework for professional liability reform being developed by the Commonwealth, States and Territory Treasury Ministers. The amendments are being advanced in consultation with the Ministerial Council on Corporations and the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General.
  • Key features of the liability model are:
    • in applying proportionate liability to a claim, a court will be able to have regard to the comparative responsibility of any wrongdoer who is not a party to the proceedings;
    • a defendant to a claim to which proportionate liability could apply will be obliged to notify the plaintiff in writing, at the earliest possible time, of the identity and alleged role of any other person(s) of whom the defendant is aware, who could be held liable for the plaintiff's loss or any part of it;
    • where a defendant fails to discharge the disclosure obligation proposed, the court will have a discretion to order that the defendant pay any or all of the plaintiff's costs, on an indemnity basis or otherwise; and
    • intentional torts and claims involving fraud will be excluded from the application of proportionate liability.
  • The Bill also makes provision for audit firms to incorporate to address concern that the structure of audit firms as partnerships has the effect of making all partners liable for the actions of each of the other partners despite the fact that a partner may not have been involved in the wrongdoing which causes the loss.

(d) CEO/CFO sign-off

  • The Bill requires Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officers of listed entities to make a written declaration to the board of directors that the annual financial statements are in accordance with the Corporations Act and accounting standards, the statements present a true and fair view of the entity's financial position and the financial records of the entity have been kept in accordance with the Corporations Act. This requirement will not detract from the responsibilities of directors.
    • While CLERP 9 did not make any policy recommendations on this issue, there has been broad stakeholder support for such a requirement. The Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit and a number of submissions received on CLERP 9 supported the introduction of this measure.

(e) Management discussion and analysis

  • In keeping with a recommendation of the HIH Royal Commission, the Bill will require the annual directors' report to include an operating and financial review. The review will contain information that members of the company would reasonably require to make an informed assessment of the operations, financial position, and future strategies of the company.

(f) Financial Reporting Panel

  • The Bill will establish a Financial Reporting Panel to resolve disputes on a non-binding basis between ASIC and companies on whether a company's financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the accounting standards and represent a true and fair view.
    • While the original CLERP 9 paper did not make any policy recommendations on this issue, there has been substantial support from stakeholders for a dispute resolution body of this nature.

(g) Protection for employees reporting breaches to ASIC

  • The Bill affords qualified privilege and protection from victimisation to company officers and others in relation to disclosures made to ASIC in good faith and on reasonable grounds regarding breaches or suspected breaches of the corporations legislation.

(h) Registration of auditors

  • The Bill provides that persons can be registered as company auditors where:
    • they meet enhanced educational requirements, including completion of a specialist course in auditing; and
    • they satisfy the practical experience requirements contained in a competency standard on auditing.
  • Auditors will be required to lodge an annual statement, in place of the current triennial reporting requirement.
    • This change to the original CLERP 9 policy has been made in response to evidence that the triennial reporting requirement does not provide up to date information for surveillance purposes. The Ramsay report endorsed this proposal.
  • ASIC will be able to impose conditions on the registration of auditors.
    • CLERP 9 did not originally propose such a facility. This measure is designed to provide ASIC with greater flexibility in considering applications for registration and to enhance post-registration supervision.

(i) Continuous disclosure and infringement notices

  • Civil liability for a breach of the Corporations Act continuous disclosure provisions will be extended to individuals involved in a contravention by a disclosing entity.
  • ASIC will be given a power to issue an infringement notice containing a financial penalty to a disclosing entity where ASIC has reasonable grounds to believe the entity has breached its continuous disclosure obligations.
    • The financial penalty specified in the notice will be $33,000, $66,000 or $100,000, depending on the entity's market capitalisation and whether the entity had previously contravened the continuous disclosure provisions.
    • ASIC will not be able to issue an infringement notice unless it has held a hearing in relation to the matter at which the entity involved must be permitted to give evidence and make submissions.
    • It is intended that infringement notices only be used in relation to less serious contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime.
  • CLERP 9 originally proposed that ASIC have the power to issue infringement notices specifying payment of a fixed financial penalty in relation to contraventions of the continuous disclosure regime.

(j) Remuneration disclosure

  • Details of directors' and executives' remuneration will need to be disclosed in a clearly marked section of the annual directors' report. Shareholders will be able to comment on the content of the report and vote on a non-binding resolution to adopt the remuneration disclosures.
    • The vote will be advisory only and does not derogate from the responsibilities of directors to determine the remuneration of executives.
  • Consistent with the current provisions of the Corporations Act, directors and senior mangers will be required to disclosure information on their remuneration. The disclosure requirements will be extended to apply to the corporate group and in this respect disclosure of the top 5 senior managers in the group will also be required.
    • The term 'senior manager' does not represent a change in the persons to whom the provisions apply. It merely reflects a technical change to implement the recommendations of the HIH Royal Commission report.
  • The Bill also amends the shareholder approval requirements in relation to directors' termination payments. It is proposed that the existing exemptions from the requirement to seek shareholder approval in respect of damages for breach of contract and agreements entered into before a director agrees to hold office will no longer apply where the payments exceed a certain limit.
    These changes build on proposals originally contained in the Corporations Amendment Bill 2002 (released for public comment in December 2002).

(k) Managing conflicts of interest

  • The Bill introduces a specific licensing obligation for financial services licensees to have adequate arrangements for managing conflicts of interest. This will be supplemented by an ASIC Policy Statement, a draft of which is expected to be released for comment during the Bill's exposure period.
    • CLERP 9 originally proposed that ASIC provide guidance on the level and manner of disclosure of conflicts of interest required under the duty to provide financial services 'efficiently, honestly and fairly'. The current proposal provides a stronger legislative basis under which ASIC can develop guidance.

(l) Disclosure of fundraising documents

  • The Bill expressly provides that disclosure documents must be presented in a clear, concise and effective manner.
  • In relation to Product Disclosure Statements for Continuously Quoted Securities, the Bill will:
    • permit issuers of managed investment products that are continuously quoted securities to issue shorter or transaction specific Product Disclosure Statements; and
    • allow ASIC to deny access to these arrangements in relation to issuers that have contravened relevant provisions of the Corporations Act in the past 12 months.
  • The Bill also provides an exemption from the requirement to prepare a disclosure document in relation to secondary sales of securities where:
    • prospectus-like information has been disclosed to the market; or
    • a prospectus in relation to the same class of securities has been lodged with ASIC.
    • Similar relief is granted in respect of the Chapter 7 secondary sale provisions.

CLERP 9 originally proposed to align more closely the exemptions from the disclosure regimes that apply to sophisticated investors and wholesale clients under Chapters 6D and 7 of the Corporations Act. To allow for a smooth transition to the Financial Services Reform Act (FSRA) regime, it was considered that this issue would be more appropriately considered after industry has fully transitioned to the FSRA regime.


1.7 SEC proposes rules to increase proxy access by shareholders

On 8 October 2003 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission approved rule proposals that would require companies to include in their proxy materials the names of nominees for director that are submitted by certain shareholders, as well as disclosure relating to those nominees. The proposals follow the recommendations made by the Division of Corporation Finance in its 15 July staff report, Review of the Proxy Process Regarding the Nomination and Election of Directors.

The staff report is available on the Commission's website at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/proxyreport.pdf.

The proposed rules would create a requirement for companies subject to the Commission proxy rules, including registered investment companies, to include in their proxy materials the names and certain other information regarding security holder nominees for election as director. The requirement would arise in cases where:

  • state law establishes the right of a shareholder to nominate a candidate for such an election, and
  • one or more specified events has occurred, providing evidence of shareholder dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the company's proxy process.

The number of nominees about whom a company would be required to include information in its proxy materials would vary depending on the size of its board of directors. Companies having eight or fewer board members would be required to include information regarding one nominee, companies with between nine and 19 board members would be required to include information regarding two nominees, and companies with boards of 20 or more members would be required to include information regarding three nominees.

The proposed procedure would require a company to include information regarding a security holder nominee for election as a director where:

  • state law provides security holders with the right to make such a nomination;
  • the procedure is applicable to a particular company (for example, the procedure would not be applicable to foreign issuers);
  • the security holders submitting the nomination meet specified eligibility requirements, and
  • the nominee meets specified eligibility requirements.

The Commission is soliciting comment on today's proposals for a 60-day period following their publication in the Federal Register.

On 8 August 2003, the Commission proposed new rules designed to implement the staff report's other major recommendations:

  • requiring more robust disclosure of the nominating committee processes of public companies, including the consideration of candidates recommended by shareholders, and
  • requiring specific disclosure of the processes by which shareholders may communicate with the directors of the companies in which they invest.

Those rule proposals can be found on the Commission's web site at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-48301.htm.


1.8 Board Proposes Auditing Standards for Internal Control over Financial Reporting

On 7 October 2003 the United States Public Company Accounting Oversight Board unanimously voted to propose and issue for public comment a standard on an audit of internal control over financial reporting. The Board also unanimously voted to propose and issue for public comment a rule which clearly defines terms used in auditing to assist firms in complying with the standards.

The auditing standard, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, addresses both the work that is required to audit internal control over financial reporting and the relationship of that audit to the audit of the financial statements. The integrated audit results in two audit opinions: one on internal control over financial reporting and one on the financial statements.

Section 404(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the Securities and Exchange Commission's related implementing rules, require the management of a public company to assess the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting, as of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year. Section 404 of the Act also requires management to include in the company's annual report to shareholders, management's conclusion as a result of that assessment about whether the company's internal control is effective. Section 404 of the Act, as well as Section 103, directs the PCAOB to establish professional standards governing the independent auditor's attestation, and reporting on, management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control.

Companies considered accelerated filers (seasoned US companies with public float exceeding $75 million) are required to comply with the internal control reporting and disclosure requirements of Section 404 of the Act for fiscal years ending on or after 15 June 2004. Accordingly, auditors engaged to audit the financial statements of such companies for fiscal years ending on or after 15 June 2004, also are required to audit and report on the company's internal control over financial reporting as of the end of such fiscal year. Other companies (including smaller companies, foreign private issuers and companies with only registered debt securities) have until fiscal years ending on or after 15 April 2005, to comply with these internal control reporting and disclosure requirements, and the requirement for audit reporting on internal control is similarly delayed.

The Board considered the possible effects of the proposed standard on small and medium-sized companies, noting that internal control is not "one-size-fits-all."

The proposed standard requires the auditor to communicate in writing to the company's audit committee all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses of which the auditor is aware. The auditor also is required to communicate in writing to the company's management all internal control deficiencies of which he or she is aware and to notify the audit committee that such communication has been made.

The proposed auditing standard identifies a number of circumstances that would be, by definition, significant deficiencies and that also would be a strong indicator that a material weakness exists:

  • Ineffective oversight of the company's external financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting by the company's audit committee. The proposed auditing standard requires the auditor to evaluate factors related to whether the audit committee is effective, including whether audit committee members act independently from management. Effective oversight by the company's board of directors, including its audit committee, is essential to the company's achievement of its objectives and is an integral part of a company's monitoring of internal control. In addition to requiring the audit committee to oversee the company's external financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting, the Act makes the audit committee directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the auditor. Thus, an ineffective audit committee can have serious detrimental effects on the company and its internal control over financial reporting as well as on the independent audit.

  • Material misstatement in the financial statements not initially identified by the company's internal controls. The audit of internal control over financial reporting and the audit of the company's financial statements are an integrated activity and are required by the Act to be a single engagement. The results of the work performed in a financial statement audit provide evidence to support the auditor's conclusions on the effectiveness of internal control, and vice-versa. Therefore, if the auditor discovers a material misstatement in the financial statements as a part of his or her audit of the financial statements, the auditor should consider whether internal control over financial reporting is effective. That the company's internal controls did not first detect the misstatement is a strong indicator that the company's internal control over financial reporting is not effective.

  • Significant deficiencies that have been communicated to management and the audit committee but that remain uncorrected after a reasonable period of time. Significant deficiencies in internal control that are not also determined to be material weaknesses, as defined in the proposed auditing standard, are not so severe as to require the auditor to conclude that internal control is ineffective. However, these deficiencies are significant, and the company should correct them. If management does not correct significant deficiencies within a reasonable period of time, that reflects poorly on tone-at-the-top and the control environment. Additionally, the significance of the deficiency can change over time (for example, increases in sales volume or added complexity in sales transaction structures would increase the severity of a significant deficiency affecting sales).

The public comment period on this proposal is 45 days. The rule must be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission to be effective.

The Board also voted on 7 October 2003 to propose Rule 3101, which describes the use of certain terms in the auditing and related professional practice standards to communicate the level of obligation imposed on registered public accounting firms and their associated persons in complying with the standards.

PCAOB Rule 3100 requires all registered public accounting firms and their associated persons to comply with the Board's Auditing and Related Professional Practice Standards in connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit report for an issuer, as defined in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Proposed Rule 3101 explains how the Board will refer to, and distinguish among, differing levels of professional obligations in the future standards it issues and in the Board's interim standards (in Rules 3200T, 3300T, 3400T, 3500T, and 3600T).

Public comments must be received by 6 November 2003. The rule must be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission.


1.9 UK boardrooms already responding to the Combined Code

Latest research released in September 2003 by professional services firm Deloitte shows that UK companies are already beginning to respond to the requirements of the revised Combined Code, which incorporates much of the Higgs, Smith and Tyson reports.

(a) Independence

Although the Combined Code does not come into effect until 1 November 2003, there have already been significant changes to boards of FTSE 350 companies. The number of executive directors sitting on FTSE 350 boards has fallen by 8% in 2003. At the same time, the number of non-executive directors (NEDs) has increased by 2.5%, indicating that companies are addressing issues of board balance.

However, despite the reduction in the number of executive directors, at least 125 independent NEDs will need to be appointed to 30% of FTSE 350 companies in order to comply fully with the Code, which requires at least half the board to be made up of independent NEDs. This number could be even greater, with the report suggesting that 240 NEDs will not pass the Code's independence criteria because they were appointed more than 10 years ago.

The independence requirements are also an issue for board chairman. In the FTSE 350, 30% of chairman are not independent as they also act as executive directors of the company and 12% of chairman are not independent as they have previously held executive positions in the same organisation. But there has been an increase in independent chairmen since 2000 when over half the chairmen in FTSE 100 companies and 40% of chairmen in FTSE 250 companies were executive directors of the company.

(b) Diversity

Deloitte's report also found that boardroom diversity remains an issue. Women continue to be under represented in the boardroom making up only 3% of FTSE 350 executive directors, just a 1% improvement from last year. Currently only one FTSE 100 company has a female chief executive, but six FTSE 350 companies are headed by a woman, compared to four companies in 2002. Of the female executive directors, 40% hold the position of financial director.

The past year has seen a greater increase in the number of female non-executive directors. In the FTSE 350, 8% of non-executive directors are women (10% in FTSE 100, 6% in FTSE250) compared to 6% last year. There is only one female non-executive chairman among FTSE 350 companies. Boards do, however, include a broad range of ages. The youngest board member of a FTSE 350 company is 29 years old and the oldest 80 years old.

(c) Transparency

Although companies are now required to disclose much more information relating to executive remuneration in their annual remuneration reports, the level of disclosure still varies considerably.


1.10 Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds Report

On 29 September 2003, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission released its staff report on the Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds.
The full report is available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf
The following is extracted from the executive summary.

(a) Background on report of the implications of the growth of hedge funds

At the request of the Commission, the staff has conducted a study of hedge funds, including their investment advisers and other service providers and their investors. The Commission's decision to study the hedge fund industry was based, in large part, on the growth of hedge fund assets coupled with the Commission's lack of information about these investment pools.

The hedge fund industry recently has experienced significant growth in both the number of hedge funds and the amount of assets under management. Based on current estimates, 6,000 to 7,000 hedge funds operate in the United States managing approximately $600 to $650 billion in assets. In the next five to ten years, hedge fund assets have been predicted to exceed $1 trillion.

The growth in hedge funds has been fuelled primarily by the increased interest of institutional investors such as pension plans, endowments and foundations seeking to diversify their portfolios with investments in vehicles that feature absolute return strategies - flexible investment strategies which hedge fund advisers use to pursue positive returns in both declining and rising securities markets, while generally attempting to protect investment principal. In addition, funds of hedge funds ("FOHF"), which invest substantially all of their assets in other hedge funds, have also fuelled this growth.

The study focused on a number of key areas of staff concern, including the recent increase in the number of hedge fund enforcement cases, the role that hedge funds play in the financial markets and the implications of the Commission's limited ability to obtain basic information about hedge funds. The staff also examined the emergence of registered FOHFs - FOHFs that register under the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("Investment Company Act") so that they may offer and sell their securities to a larger number of investors and FOHFs that register under the Investment Company Act and the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") so that they may offer and sell their securities in the public market. Finally, the staff reviewed hedge fund disclosure and marketing practices, valuation practices and conflicts of interest.

(b) Concerns relating to hedge fund growth

As noted above, the study was, in large part, the result of the Commission's recognition that it lacks information about hedge fund advisers that are not registered under the Advisers Act and the hedge funds that they manage. Although this recognition is not new, the Commission's attention was focused again on the hedge fund industry as a result of the recent growth of the industry and the increase of investments in hedge funds by institutions. Although hedge fund investment advisers are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, they are not subject to any reporting or standardized disclosure requirements, nor are they subject to Commission examination. Consequently, the Commission has only indirect information about these entities and their trading practices and is hampered in its ability to develop regulatory policy as hedge funds become more important participants in our financial markets.

The Commission is concerned about the inability to examine hedge fund advisers and evaluate the effect of the strategies used in managing hedge funds on the financial markets. The Commission is also concerned about the lack of applicable regulatory measures necessary to ensure that material information to assist investors in making fully informed investment decisions is available.

The Commission's inability to examine hedge fund advisers has the direct effect of putting the Commission in a "wait and see" posture vis-à-vis fraud and other misconduct. The Commission typically is able to take action with respect to such fraud and other misconduct only after it receives relevant information from third parties (for example, investors or service providers), and frequently only after significant losses have occurred. In contrast, the Commission believes that its examination program not only allows the Commission to identify misconduct by registered investment advisers earlier, but it also assists in identifying and possibly preventing certain misconduct from developing into fraud. The Commission is also concerned that some hedge fund investors may not always receive useful information about the investment adviser and its management of the fund. In addition, the Commission believes that disclosure to some hedge fund investors could be improved to address conflicts of interests of hedge fund advisers.

One of the Commission's key concerns relates to the manner by which hedge fund advisers value hedge fund assets. The broad discretion that these advisers have to value assets and the lack of independent review over that activity gives rise to questions about whether some hedge funds' portfolio holdings are accurately valued. The Commission's concern not only reflects its recognition of the incentives that may cause an adviser to inaccurately value hedge fund assets, but it also reflects its concern that registered funds that invest their assets in hedge funds may lack access to information that enables them to "fair value" their interests in hedge funds and therefore accurately calculate their net asset value.

(c) Staff recommendations relating to hedge fund advisers, funds of hedge funds and hedge funds:

  • the Commission should consider requiring hedge fund advisers to register as investment advisers under the Advisers Act, taking into account whether the benefits outweigh the burdens of registration;
  • the Commission and its staff should consider addressing certain valuation, suitability and fee disclosure issues relating to registered FOHFs;
  • the Commission should consider permitting general solicitation in fund offerings limited to qualified purchasers;
  • the staffs of the Commission and the NASD should monitor closely capital introduction services provided by broker-dealers;
  • the Commission should encourage the hedge fund industry to embrace and further develop best practices;
  • the Commission should continue its efforts to improve investor education regarding hedge; and
  • the commission should consider issuing a concept release to examine the wider use of hedge fund.


1.11 Shareholders' rights in DLCs

On 29 September 2003, the Australian Council of Superannuation Investors ("ACSI") called on the Federal Government to undertake a comprehensive policy review of the major governance issues that it argues seriously weaken key shareholder rights in dual listed company structures.

ACSI is calling for this action in response to research commissioned from leading commercial barrister and listed Company Director SEK Hulme QC.

Some of the concerns discussed in the paper include:

(a) Removal of directors

The DLC structure makes it much more difficult, if not impossible, for shareholders to remove directors if the board opposes such action.

(b) Obstacles to takeovers

The traditional sanction available to the market for non-performing companies is a takeover. If the dual listed company does not support a takeover bid, it will be inherently difficult to pursue. That is evidenced by the speculation regarding a GE takeover of Brambles and recognition in the market that a hostile bid for a dual listed company is very difficult. A successful bid would require acceptance by two different sets of shareholders in two different jurisdictions.

The DLC Board also has discretionary powers in a takeover that do not exist in 'normal' single listed companies. Takeover arrangements for DLCs need further consideration given the nature of the structure that cuts across at least two jurisdictions. Current DLC arrangements could also increase the risk of litigation, causing a disgruntled bidder to pursue legal action to seek to overcome any perceived or actual impediments.

A summary of the paper is on the ACSI website.


1.12 SEC Issues Policy Statement on Business Continuity Planning for Trading Markets

On 26 September 2003 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission issued a Policy Statement setting forth its view that self-regulatory organizations operating trading markets (SRO Markets) and electronic communication networks (ECNs) should apply certain basic principles in their business continuity planning. The Commission also requests comments on the Policy Statement.

The principles outlined in the Policy Statement include planning for the resumption of trading no later than the next business day following a wide-scale disruption, geographic diversity between primary and backup sites, assuring the full resilience of important shared information systems (such as the consolidated market data stream), and confirming the effectiveness of backup arrangements through testing. Each SRO Market and ECN should implement plans reflecting these principles as soon as practicable, and strive to do so by the end of 2004. Commission staff intends to engage in an ongoing and individualized dialogue with each SRO Market and ECN to discuss application of these principles in a manner most appropriate for the particular trading market.

The Commission believes it important for the SRO Markets and ECNs to take concrete steps to strengthen their resilience to address the continuing, serious risks to the US financial system posed by the post 11 September environment. To date, the trading markets have made significant progress in increasing the robustness of their business continuity plans. By applying the principles outlined in the Policy Statement, the Commission believes the SRO Markets and ECNs will better assure their own resilience and that of the US financial system.

The Policy Statement can be accessed on the SEC's web site at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/34-48545.htm


1.13 Independent Directors Crucial to Corporate Governance: Hong Kong report

On 18 September 2003, the Hong Kong Institute of Company Secretaries (the Institute) released its report on Independent Non-Executive Directors (INEDs) titled "The Duties and Responsibilities of Independent Non-Executive Directors of Hong Kong Listed Companies".

The report details the findings of a survey conducted by the Institute of 75 companies listed on the Main Board of The Hong Kong Stock Exchange as at 7 November 2002. Recognizing the likely difference in characteristics between companies of varying sizes, the sample was broken down into 3 categories according to market capitalisation. The report highlighted that 47% of the companies surveyed had only two INEDs. Soon to be introduced amendments to the Listing Rules will require listed companies to have at least three INEDs. While 69% of the higher capitalised companies would comply, the percentage of INEDs for lower capitalised companies' drops to 13%.

Other findings include:

  • The average age of an INED is 58 years but those of smaller capitalised companies are younger while almost 40% of INEDs of higher capitalised companies are older than 60 years.
  • Only 5% of all INEDs are female and 87% of companies have all male boards, no company surveyed had more than 2 female INEDs.
  • The average length of existing service was 6.7 years, but 7% of INEDs have already served more than 20 years.


1.14 UK House of Commons Trade and Industry report: Rewards for Failure

On 16 September 2003, the United Kingdom House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee released its report on severance pay for company executives. The report sought consultation on whether, and if so what, new measures might be required to tackle excessive 'golden parachutes' for the outgoing executives of poorly performing companies.

In the course of the inquiry evidence was taken from the Investment Management
Association (IMA); the Institute of Directors (IoD); the Work Foundation; the Association of British Insurers (ABI); the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF); the Confederation of British Industry (CBI); and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In addition the Committee received written submissions from thirteen organisations and individuals.

The report concluded:

  • Witnesses were in no doubt that there is a genuine problem of contracts that provide for excessive severance packages for directors who have failed to improve the performance of their company. Whilst the examples of GSK or Marconi are exceptional in their scale, they clearly represent the tip of the iceberg. Directors of large companies should expect remuneration commensurate with the level of responsibility they have and the relatively precarious nature of their employment. A lengthy and successful tenure will also inevitably be reflected in high rewards and, potentially, a sizable severance package. However, the increases in salary and bonuses that directors have experienced in recent years, on which severance packages are based, have not been a reflection of tougher performance targets or better company performance. It would appear that executives have been rewarded not only for success but for failure as well.
  • The Committee is not convinced that the current scale of executives' severance packages is a product of competition for scarce talent in an international market. Executives in the UK are paid more than those in any country other than the USA, where executive pay is so much greater that there seems little prospect of recruitment from there on a large scale.
  • The Committee would hope that the recent examples of shareholder revolt and the wider public concern generated by the instances of rewards for failure would prompt all companies to look hard at the way in which executives' contracts are constructed.
  • The Committee can see no reason why, in principle, the notice periods of executives should be any different from those of the rest of the population. UK executives are already well remunerated and have become increasingly so over recent years. Many other areas of employment can be considered as risky but do not have the benefit of such high salaries. The Committee urges companies not only to adopt one year contracts, other than in exceptional circumstances, but also to specify separately the notice period, in order to bring the notice periods of executives more closely into line with those of their other employees.
  • Phased payments are clearly a means by which severance pay can be reduced. Departed executives will receive payments only for the period during which they are out of work and the obligation to mitigate loss means that they should not be able to remain idle whilst waiting for the full value of the severance package to be paid.
  • However, the full benefits of phased payments can be realised only if the obligation to mitigate loss is strictly enforced. The Committee was told that the general principle is enshrined in common law and yet, it seems, it is inconsistently applied. The Committee would expect companies to enforce the duty to mitigate losses properly and to make the phased payments only whilst the recipient remains out of work.
  • If the targets upon which bonuses are based are set at a sufficiently challenging level, and an executive is being removed for underperformance, the Committee cannot see how significant performance-related elements of the remuneration package can legitimately be included in the severance package. Given the seemingly endless rise in the value of elements other than basic pay in executives' total remuneration, the problem of excessive rewards for failure is unlikely to be solved unless companies address this issue properly.

A full copy of the report is available at:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmtrdind/914/914.pdf


1.15 Study finds empirical evidence of a correlation between corporate risk quality and financial performance

There is a strong correlation between companies' risk quality and financial performance, according to a new study released on 16 September 2003 of 438 publicly quoted companies across a broad range of industries. The study, 'Improving Risk Quality to Drive Value,' conducted by Oxford Metrica, an independent internationally recognised strategic advisory firm, analysed a global portfolio of firms that comprised a total market capitalisation of US$3.4 trillion (£2.1 trillion).

The findings reveal that companies with high risk quality have low cash flow volatility, a core value driver. Additionally, the study concludes that risk quality is a strategic issue and a key characteristic of a value-creating firm, as well as an essential aspect of effective corporate governance procedures.

'Risk Mark' - a benchmarking system created by commercial and industrial property insurer FM Global for evaluating a firm's risk quality and relative probability for loss compared with that of thousands of other firms in various industries - provided Oxford Metrica with a data source for the research.

The premise of the study is that a company need not experience a disruption to its business to demonstrate the value of investing in risk quality. Furthermore, it indicates that diligently following property risk improvement procedures is a characteristic of value-creating firms.

In order to evaluate the risk management investment decision in a shareholder value framework, the research first defines what is meant by 'value' and identifies core drivers. Second, the metrics of risk and value used in the study are defined, and third, the relationship between risk quality and financial performance is demonstrated and measured. Finally, the study portfolio is analysed in a broader context to establish the generalisability of results.

In the context of the study, risk quality is defined in terms of property risk management. It is driven by the core operational activities of a business, the physical location of those activities and how they are managed and protected.

The executive summary of the study results is available at:
http://www.fmglobal.com/pdfs/oxfordmetrica.pdf


1.16 CBI unveils guidelines on severance packages

In its response to the UK Department of Trade and Industry consultation on termination payments for directors, on 16 September 2003, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) unveiled guidelines on directors' severance packages. They recommend immediate disclosure of contractual terms and conditions, one year rolling contracts, part-payment in shares and regular contractual reviews. They also outline ways of handling the different elements of severance packages - basic pay, earned bonus and pensions.

(a) Best Practice Guidelines

i. Key contractual terms should be announced to shareholders immediately after the parties are committed to each other and severance details should also be announced after agreement between the company and the individual.

ii. Details of directors' contracts are often made public in company annual reports which may not be published for some months after an appointment has been made. The CBI recommends that key details of directors' contracts are made available at the earliest opportunity, so shareholders know speedily exactly what commitments have been made. Severance terms should be similarly announced.

iii. The terminology of each clause in the contract must be clear to ensure the reader can determine the precise nature of the agreed terms and conditions, and confusing terms like 'guaranteed bonus' should be avoided.

iv. Severance entitlements should be restricted to basic pay, earned bonus and pensions accrual only in line with pay. They should take account of the individual's circumstances and opportunity to mitigate loss by finding another job.

Contracts should provide for the usual payment of severance, unless there are special circumstances which are clearly explained to shareholders, to be by monthly payments until the end of an agreed period or until another job is obtained, whichever is earlier. Payments under share or other equity based incentive plans should be made under normal scheme rules and not special departure conditions. Any attempt to enhance pension payments outside contracted entitlement should require specific shareholder approval.

v. In normal circumstances, directors should have contracts no longer than one year to help minimise the cost of severance. It is, however, recognised that circumstances do sometimes exist which dictate a longer initial contract.

vi. Within two years newly appointed directors should have terms and conditions which are in line with those of incumbent Board directors.

New directors may need to be tempted away from existing secure positions so an additional amount of initial contractual security may be needed but the CBI recommends that those contracts are brought into line within two years of recruitment.

vii. To strengthen the alignment between shareholders and company directors the CBI recommends that a proportion of remuneration should be directed into shares bought on the open market which should be held for three years.


1.17 New US survey shows Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased effectiveness of audit committees and corporate governance

On 8 September 2003 James H Quigley chief executive officer of Deloitte & Touche LLP, told an audience at the National Press Club in Washington DC that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is having a positive effect on corporate governance, causing audit committees to meet more frequently and for greater duration.

As of 3 September, Deloitte researchers had received responses from 66 of the firm's top clients on a range of corporate governance issues to determine how they are weathering the changing business climate, including regulatory changes, over the past year. The client survey conducted by Deloitte also asked leaders how Sarbanes-Oxley was affecting audit committees.

The Deloitte survey showed that audit committees are meeting more frequently than they did prior to passage of Sarbanes-Oxley. Of the 66 companies surveyed, the number of audit committees meeting more than six times per year increased from 11 companies prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley to 39 following the enactment of the legislation.

The time spent in committee sessions has also risen significantly. Half the companies surveyed met for less than one hour per meeting prior to Sarbanes-Oxley. Post Sarbanes-Oxley, the number of committees meeting less than one hour dropped to 10 percent of the survey participants.

The responses came largely from manufacturing, consumer, and financial services companies. The majority of responses came from companies with revenues of US$1 billion to US$5 billion (48 percent) or more than US$10 billion (26 percent).


1.18 Corporate Law Judgments Milestone

Since September 1999, the Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation at the University of Melbourne website has offered a comprehensive database of corporate law judgments delivered by all courts of all Australian jurisdictions since that date. In October this year, the website added its 2,000th judgment to the site.

The database features a flexible search screen that enables practitioners, students and the general public to search for cases according to date, judge, court, case name, keywords or phrase. The Law Institute Library recently reviewed the Corporate Law Judgments site and described it as "a great alternative to AustLII for locating corporate law decisions".


1.19 Study of voting levels in UK companies

Pension Investment Research Consultants' (PIRC) annual proxy voting survey for AGMs held by FTSE All Share companies between August 2002 and July 2003 (545 respondents), has found that the substantial increase in average voting levels shown last year has not continued despite the introduction of the CREST electronic voting platform and the weight of regulatory pressure towards encouraging shareholder activism.

  • The average voting level for FTSE 350 companies this year was around 55% with the average voting level for FTSE All Share companies at 53%.
  • These figures are negatively affected by the investment company sector (average voting level 24%) If these 77 companies are excluded from the calculation, then the average voting level at FTSE350 companies rises to nearly 58% and for FTSE All Share companies to just over 56%.
  • There is a marked difference between voting levels at FTSE100 companies where the average is some 53% and FTSE MidCap turnout (the next largest 250 companies) where PIRC recorded an average figure over 61%. The difference is most likely attributable to the comparatively high non-UK ownership of UK listed equity at larger companies as major institutions are less likely to vote their international portfolios due to the difficulties of cross border voting. According to government statistics released in July 2003, 32.1% of UK equity is now held outside the UK and 91.5% of this overseas investment is held in FTSE100 companies.

2. Recent ASIC Developments
2.1 ASIC class order provides relief to allow multi-issuer PDS

On 23 October 2003, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) released a new Class Order declaration [CO 03/0876], relating to the preparation of a product disclosure statement ("PDS") under s.1013A of the Corporations Act 2001 ("the Act") by multiple issuers.

The Class Order relief permits a PDS to be prepared by more than one issuer under s.1013A of the Act where:

  • the issuers are related bodies corporate and continue to be related bodies corporate for so long as the interests in the financial products are being offered and issued under a single PDS;
  • the financial products offered in a single PDS document are of the same kind. For example, it would be permissible to prepare a multi-issuer PDS in relation to all unlisted managed investment products, all superannuation products, all life insurance products, or all general insurance products but not any combination of these products;
  • the relationship between the issuers and products is disclosed;
  • the financial products offered under a single PDS are either all unlisted or all listed; and
  • the PDS provisions in Part 7.9 of the Act apply to all of the financial products offered by the issuers in the PDS. (Note that this requirement does not preclude the combination of a prospectus and a PDS for offers of stapled securities)

ASIC has adopted this approach to promote commercial efficiency and flexibility for related issuers in a conglomerate group, whilst maintaining the safeguards afforded to consumers under the Act.

By requiring the PDS to relate to a particular kind of financial product, ASIC believes that consumers will be better able to compare the merits (and relative costs) of like products offered by various issuers within a corporate group. There is less likelihood that consumers may be confused about the benefits and risks of a group's products when they are of the same kind.

ASIC recognises that there may be some circumstances where related issuers may wish to use a single PDS for different kinds of financial product. In these situations, ASIC will consider granting relief on a case-by-case basis.

A copy of the Class Order can be obtained from the ASIC's Infoline by calling 1300 300 630 or from the ASIC website at http://www.asic.gov.au/co

For further information contact:
Pamela McAlister
FSR Director - Legal & Technical
Telephone: 03 9280 3450
Mobile: 0402 426 956


2.2 Amended Pro Forma 209: AFS licence conditions

On 22 October 2003, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) reissued Pro Forma 209 Australian financial services licence conditions (PF 209). The amendments to PF 209 are a result of the introduction of new regulations and changes to ASIC policy, including Policy Statement 166 Licensing: Financial requirements (PS 166) and Policy Statement 175 Licensing: Financial product advisers - Conduct and disclosure (PS 175). These changes come into effect immediately.

The following summary explains the nature and purpose of each amendment. Australian financial services (AFS) licensees who wish to take advantage of the changes outlined below must apply for a variation to their AFS licence using ASIC form FS03, requesting that the revised versions of all of the conditions and definitions listed below be imposed.

PF 209 and form FS03 are available via the Financial Services homepage on the ASIC website at http://www.asic.gov.au/fs.

(a) Summary of Amendments to PF 209

(i) Authorisation

Condition 1: There are new authorisations to cover licensees who provide financial services in relation to consumer credit insurance only.

The life insurance product authorisations have been expanded to include any products issued by a Registered Life Insurance Company that are backed by one or more of its statutory funds.

(ii) Base level financial requirements

Condition 11: The amendment provides a licensee with an additional means of meeting the 3-month cash flow requirement in lieu of Option 1 or Option 2.

A licensee is now exempted from the requirement to prepare 3-monthly cash flow projections where an eligible provider provides an enforceable and unqualified commitment to pay an unlimited amount in respect of the licensee's obligations for a period of 3 months.

ASIC will also amend Parts F and G of PS 166 to reflect this change.

(iii) Financial requirements for foreign exchange dealers

Condition 18: This condition has been amended to reflect changes to financial requirements imposed on foreign exchange dealers applying for an AFS licence.

ASIC has changed its policy under PS 166 to permit all foreign exchange dealers to comply with an adjusted surplus liquid funds (ASLF) requirement reflecting Part F of PS 166 as an alternative to the $10 million tier one capital requirements under Part G.

(iv) Financial requirements for licensee transacting with clients

Condition 20: Minor amendment to add the word "monetary" before the word "liabilities" in the first line of the condition.

(v) Audit opinion on financial requirements

Condition 26: Adjusted to reflect changes to condition 11 and forthcoming changes to PS 166 in relation to the areas covered under the audit for the cash needs requirement of Base Level Financial Requirements.

(vi) External dispute resolution schemes

Condition 30: The purpose of this amendment is to exempt a licensee from the requirement to be a member of an External Dispute Resolution Scheme (EDRS) until 11 March 2004, to the extent that there is no EDRS in place that covers complaints relating to the type of financial service provided by the licensee.

(vii) Agreement with holder of financial product on trust

Condition 32: This has been amended to exempt licensees who appoint sub-custodians from some of the requirements under the condition, where the licensee demonstrates by documentary evidence that compliance with these requirements is not practicable.

(viii) Protection of underlying land in primary production

Condition 43: ASIC has amended this condition for licensees of timber plantation schemes, to allow them up to 9 months after the issue of interests in the scheme to register the investors' interests in the land under State or Territory land titles law. The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that the registration requirement imposed by this licence condition does not have the potential to deprive investors in timber plantation schemes of the benefits of the 12-month prepayment rule introduced by Treasury into taxation legislation in 2002.

(ix) Stockbroker responsibility for subsidiary companies

Condition 55: This is a new condition that will apply to a stockbroker who elects to take responsibility for the acts and omissions of a subsidiary nominee company who provides custody services on its behalf.

(x) Retention of financial services guides, statements of advice and material relating to personal advice

Condition 56: This is a new condition that will be imposed on all licensees and will apply where a licensee provides financial product advice to retail clients. The condition applies the record keeping requirements set out in PS 175.

(b) Definitions

  • consumer credit insurance - new definition to apply to licensees who are authorised to provide financial services in relation to consumer credit insurance only
  • financial assets - definition amended so that it is now consistent with the definition of financial assets set out in Policy Statement 130 Managed investments: Licensing (PS 130)


2.3 ASIC releases version 4 of eLicensing and AFS licensing kit

On 21 October 2003, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) released version 4 of the eLicensing system, together with an updated version of the Australian financial services (AFS) Licensing Kit, for entities wishing to apply for an AFS licence before the end of the two-year transition period on 10 March 2004.

Version 4 takes into consideration the widening of eligibility to apply for an AFS licence under the streamlining process following regulations made on 11 March 2003, and other recent changes to regulations. It also takes into account recent ASIC Class Orders CO 03/645: FSR Act transition - regulated activities - deposit products and insurance products and CO 03/705: Non-cash payment facilities - licensing exemption.

The release of Version 4 follows recent updates to ASIC's industry guides, which are designed to assist applicants choose the right authorisations and assessment process when applying for an AFS licence. These guides incorporate the version 4 changes and provide further clarification of ASIC's operational processes.

Applicants who have started preparing their applications in version 2 should be aware that they will not be able to submit those applications after 21 October 2003. However, applicants who have started in version 3 will not have to start their applications again.

More information on the eLicensing system and the AFS Licensing Kit, as well as
ongoing licensee obligations, is available via the Applying for an AFS licence page at http://www.asic.gov.au/afsl


2.4 ASIC provides overview of applications for relief under FSRA

On 10 October 2003, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) provided an overview of its decisions in some recent applications for relief from the licensing, conduct and disclosure provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act) as amended by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSRA).

ASIC has released this information both to illustrate examples of the sorts of matters where it has provided relief, and to make the manner in which ASIC has responded to specific matters fully transparent. The overview also includes examples of the circumstances in which ASIC has refused relief.

'ASIC intends to issue these overviews at least twice-yearly to assist industry in understanding our approach to regulation under the FSRA regime', ASIC Director of Financial Services Regulation (Legal and Technical Operations), Ms Pamela McAlister said.

'While each application for relief is considered on a case-by-case basis, this overview provides some guidance on the circumstances in which ASIC will consider granting relief. However, potential applicants should not assume that ASIC will provide relief in the future in similar cases, as each relief application depends on the unique facts and circumstances of the case', Ms McAlister said

ASIC's general policy is to only consider granting relief from the requirements of Chapter 7 of the Act to address atypical or unforeseen circumstances and unintended consequences of those provisions.