
Bulletin No 73, September 2003
Editor: Professor Ian Ramsay, Director, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation
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CONTENTS
1. RECENT
CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS
(A)
Company directors' survey of ASX corporate governance guidelines
(B) Getting value from AGMs
(C) Release share
register only for a proper purpose
(D) CEO turnover study
(E) Government's response to the recommendations of the
HIH Royal Commission
(F) 2003 US board of directors
governance and remuneration survey
(G) Rehabilitating large
and complex enterprises in financial difficulties
(H)
Dividend reinvestment plans continue to grow
(I) FSA
proposals for cross-border financial services shopping from home
(J) Review of the Insurance Contracts Act
(K)
Audit committee key to investor confidence
(L) Trends in
corporate responsibility
(M) FSA proposes new financial
rules for life insurers
(N) New fraud and planning auditing
standards approved for exposure
(O) New Zealand Exchange
releases final corporate governance submission
(P) New
code of banking practice released
(A) New
policy on takeover relief
(B) Discretionary powers -
wholesale foreign financial services providers
(C)
Reporting requirements for AFS licensees who are individuals
(D) Court rules National Exchange offer is misleading and
deceptive
(E) ASIC issues draft section 1013DA 'SRI'
guidelines
(F) National wealth management company to pay
235,000 investors $67.2 million compensation
(A) ASX and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange sign MOU
(B) ASIC releases first
ASX assessment
4. RECENT
TAKEOVERS PANEL MATTERS
(A) Panel
refuses AuIron Energy application
(B) Medium neutral
citation system
(C) Breakfree 02 - Panel affirms ASIC
decision
5. RECENT CORPORATE LAW DECISIONS
(A) National
Exchange offer misleading and deceptive
(B) Does the
principle in Re Londonderry's Settlements apply to superannuation
schemes?
(C) What is a demand arising otherwise than by a
contract for the purposes of bankruptcy?
(D) Voidable
transactions and section 588FF: "satisfaction" requires examination of FACTS
(E) Cheques - proper endorsement or conversion?
(F) The grant of relief under section 1322(4) of the Corporations Act
(G) Further guidance on statutory derivative
actions
(H) Stamp duty payable on in specie distributions
upon winding up
(I) Supervision of administrators
(J) Voidable preference payments
(K) Determining
who is the appropriate person to carry out the winding up of an unregistered
managed investment scheme
(L) The limits of shareholder
power
(M) Privilege against exposure to a
penalty
6. RECENT CORPORATE LAW JOURNAL ARTICLES
1. RECENT
CORPORATE LAW AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS
(A) COMPANY DIRECTORS' SURVEY OF ASX CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDELINES
On 25 September 2003, the Australian Institute of Company Directors ("AICD") published the results of a survey of the directors of Australia's 1,500 publicly-listed companies. The survey reveals that boards are willing to adapt to the new world of corporate governance reporting introduced by the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate Governance Guidelines and Best Practice Recommendations.
While accepting the guidelines, the survey highlights the concerns of directors over some elements. Firstly, there needs to be greater education for both companies and investors that it is totally acceptable for companies to explain why they do not follow some of the recommendations. Sixty-two per cent of respondents believe an explanation of "non-compliance" may discourage potential investors, so it is essential that investors understand that an explanation is compliance with the guidelines.
Secondly, directors believe the definition of "independence" found in the guidelines needs to be refined as only 27 per cent believe the definition "adds value" in its current form. Forty-three per cent of respondents currently comply with the recommendation of a majority of "independent" directors on the board, 11 per cent stated they will change the make up of their board while 46 per cent prefer to explain why they do not comply.
The survey highlights confusion among directors regarding what they specifically need to comply with, with many directors confused as to the difference between recommendations, commentary and guidance notes. Seventy-nine per cent of respondents are concerned that compliance with the commentary and guidance notes will be expected.
Finally, the survey points to the need for a longer transition period for small to medium-sized businesses, businesses which will experience the most difficulty in adopting the guidelines. Only 44 per cent of respondents intend to adopt the guidelines in the current reporting year.
Chief Executive Officer of AICD, John Hall, said it is encouraging that company directors are recognising the importance of the guidelines and have illustrated their commitment to them. The results of the survey will be provided to the Implementation Review Group, established by the ASX Corporate Governance Council to review and refine the guidelines.
A full copy of the survey
results is available on the AICD's website at
http://www.companydirectors.com.au/index.html
On 23 September 2003, the Business Council of Australia released a new Code of Conduct for annual general meetings. BCA President, Dr John Schubert, said the Code, developed by the BCA's Chairmen's Panel, is designed to increase the value of AGMs for shareholders, Boards and management.
"The annual general meeting is an important element of corporate governance and the main opportunity each year for ordinary shareholders to comment and question the Board and management of their companies.
"The new Code of Conduct will improve the efficiency of those meetings and increase the opportunity for all shareholders to speak, by providing a process to ensure that shareholders are considerate of each other's right to participate," he said.
The Code has been developed with initial input from BHP Billiton and in consultation with the Australian Shareholders' Association. The BCA has now written to the Chairmen of the top 50 companies in Australia, encouraging them to adopt the Code for their company AGMs.
"We believe that wide adoption of the Code will demonstrate business's commitment to the full participation of shareholders in effective and meaningful AGMs, while at the same time setting a standard for managing those that would seek to disrupt the meetings," said Dr Schubert.
The Code is available on the BCA website at http://www.bca.com.au
(C) RELEASE
SHARE REGISTER ONLY FOR A PROPER PURPOSE
Chartered Secretaries Australia (CSA) has urged the government to amend current legislation so that it would require the request for a release of a company's share register to meet a proper purpose test.
Following successful proceedings recently brought by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) against National Exchange, Richard Jones, Chairman of Chartered Secretaries Australia's (CSA) National Legislation Review Committee, says issues of privacy within shareholder registries must be further tightened now to prevent anymore share market 'bottom feeders' preying on nervous shareholders.
"What we need is legislation that gets to the core of the problem. Significant concerns exist in relation to access to share registers and communication with shareholders. At the moment anyone can ask for the share register and a company has to supply it. That effectively denies shareholders the privacy rights they would have as a consumer," said Mr Jones.
The law as it stands requires companies to give anyone access to their share registers. The only control on the use of the information is that it be used for matters related to shareholders. Companies cannot refuse access even if they believe the use would be to support unethical or unfair practices. "This is a fundamental flaw, and it allows schemes such as those of National Exchange to continue. Companies have no alternative but to write to shareholders outlining the true position, often at considerable cost. The law needs to be changed to give companies the power to reject requests for access to their registers if those requesting access cannot satisfy the company that the request meets a proper purpose test."
ASIC needs to develop guidelines, or a definition, for a proper purpose test in this instance to assist companies.
For further information
contact:
Mr Richard Jones
Chartered Secretaries Australia
Telephone:
03 8641 0296
The recent case between ASIC and National Exchange is reviewed in Item 5A of this Bulletin.
New Australian findings in a study by international management consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, released on 17 September 2003, reveal that CEO turnover in Australia is higher than the global rate and the average tenure of Australian CEO's is almost half that of their global peers.
Booz Allen Hamilton conducted the Australian arm of the global study in a joint initiative with the Business Council of Australia (BCA) to analyse CEO turnover in Australia's largest enterprises.
The study found that the average tenure for CEO's leaving office forced or otherwise, in Australia in 2002 was 4.4 years, down from 5.8 years in 2001 and half the global average of 8.6 years. Australian CEO's have just two years to achieve results or face an increased risk of being fired within the next two years.
Among the study's findings:
· CEO turnover in Australia
is higher than the global rate (Australia 16.8% versus 10.1% globally).
· In
Australia CEO turnover related to mergers and acquisition is higher than the
global average (Australia 21% versus 14% globally) influenced by the strength of
the Australian economy.
· Succession from within the company continues to be
the primary source of CEO talent in Australia and similar to global trends,
Australia saw a number of high profile younger CEO's exit.
· CEO's hired from
outside the company are more polarised in their performance, with returns to
shareholders much stronger in the first half of the CEO's tenure than the
second.
· Financial Services is the safest sector for CEO's in Australia -
similar to global trends.
Some key messages emerged from the study:
· It is critical for CEO's
to define their strategy quickly and base it on realistic performance targets
and an appropriate horizon for delivery.
· It is sustaining change and
persistently exceeding the market's expectations that will continue to be the
hallmark of all enduring CEO's.
· Leadership style, individual skills and
personality of a CEO remain central to the company's ability to achieve
alignment and successfully drive change.
· CEO's need to actively engage
boards and communicate their strategic plans, to ensure directors understand the
complexities involved in executing change.
· CEO's need to reflect jointly
with their boards how to create a success story, and learn how to monitor the
effectiveness of their working relationship.
Mr John Schubert, President of the BCA, said that the study flagged important messages for Australian companies, investors and the market generally.
"The study underlines the fact that our top executives must meet a growing and increasingly complex range of performance expectations within the context of having a far shorter tenure than their global peers," he said.
"It also highlights a worrying trend that our markets have an increasingly focus on short-term outcomes from CEO's as opposed to their capacity to deliver longer-term strategies of value creation."
The study is available on the BCA website at http://www.bca.com.au
(E) GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HIH ROYAL COMMISSION
The report of the HIH Royal Commission into the failure of the HIH Insurance Group was released on 16 April 2003. Since that time, the Government has implemented an enhanced governance structure for the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and appointed three new APRA members from 1 July 2003.
The Government has also referred 56 possible breaches of the law to the relevant agencies and committed funding of $42 million to ensure the efficient investigation and prosecution of any civil or criminal charges arising from the collapse of HIH.
On 12 September 2003, the Treasurer announced the Government's final response to the findings of the Royal Commission. The Royal Commissioner made 61 policy recommendations. A summary of Government's response to the recommendations is included here. Some of the recommendations fall under the responsibility of various independent bodies such as APRA, the Australian Stock Exchange and the Australian Accounting Standards Board.
The Treasurer has referred the relevant recommendations to those bodies and asked them to carefully consider Justice Owen's recommendations and advise him of their response. Justice Owen also made a number of recommendations that deal with State and Territory regulation and taxation of general insurance. The Treasurer has written to the States and Territories encouraging them to carefully consider the recommendations of the report and to take appropriate action.
Justice Owen recommended that the Commonwealth Government extend prudential regulation to all discretionary insurance-like products. In addition, Justice Owen referred to insurance cover underwritten offshore, although he made no specific recommendation in this respect. Some level of insurance cover in the Australian market is currently provided by discretionary mutual funds (DMFs) and direct offshore foreign insurers (DOFIs). However, these entities are not subject to the same level of prudential regulation by APRA as Australian authorised insurers.
To inform its consideration of the appropriate regulatory framework for DMFs and DOFIs, the Government is commissioning a review to examine the extent and nature of cover provided by DMFs and DOFIs.
The review will be headed by Mr Gary Potts, former Executive Director of Markets Group, Department of the Treasury. The review will be taking submissions and details of the review, including the terms of reference, are available on the Treasury website.
Recommendation 61 of the report proposed that the Commonwealth Government introduce a scheme to support policyholders of insurance companies in the event of the failure of any such company. The appropriateness of government intervention following financial institution collapses should be considered in terms of its possible financial system-wide impacts and consequences for the design of the regulatory framework. These are complex matters. Moreover, the precise design of any guarantee, its incentive properties and its associated financial costs warrant close consideration.
With this in mind, the Government is commissioning a comprehensive study to examine these issues. Professor Kevin Davis, Professor of Finance at The University of Melbourne, has agreed to lead the study. Following the completion of the study, Treasury will undertake a public consultation process on possible policy options. The details of the study, including the proposed process and terms of reference are available on the Treasury website.
The Commission made a number of recommendations relating to corporate governance and financial reporting. Some of these recommendations will be implemented in the CLERP 9 draft legislation which is intended to be released for public comment in October this year.
The terms of reference for the review of discretionary mutual funds and direct offshore foreign insurers and further information about the review are available at http://dmfreview.treasury.gov.au
The terms of reference for the study of financial system guarantees and further information about the study are available at http://fsgstudy.treasury.gov.au/content/default.asp
|
HIH
RECOMMENDATIONS |
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE |
|
Recommendation 1 proposes that the
Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), the relevant accounting
standards and the ASX Listing Rules relating to directors’ remuneration be
reviewed to ensure they achieve clear and comprehensive disclosure of all
remuneration paid to directors. |
Accept. This recommendation is being
implemented under the CLERP 9 process. |
|
Recommendation 2 proposes that the
Corporations Act be changed to impose duties based on functions rather than
status (eg director or officer). |
Anomalies in the definition of officer will
be corrected in CLERP 9. The Government does not propose to recast the duties of
directors and officers at this time but will ask the Companies and Markets
Advisory Committee, taking wider submissions, to review this question in light
of the Royal Commission’s observations. |
|
Recommendation 3 proposes that the
Government broaden the membership of the AASB to include
non-accountants. |
Accept. Current legislation provides for
this to be implemented. The Government will write to the Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) about this matter. |
|
Recommendation 4 proposes that Australia participate
in the development of international accounting standards. |
Accept. This recommendation is being
implemented through Australia’s adoption of international accounting
standards. |
|
Recommendation 5 proposes that Australia
reserve the right to require more stringent accounting standards that are not
inconsistent with relevant international standards. |
Accept. This recommendation reflects the
current situation. |
|
Recommendation 6
proposes that the AASB alter its Urgent Issues Group (UIG) or create
a separate group to promptly issue binding rules on the
interpretation/application of accounting standards; and that this group include
lawyers and users of financial
statements. |
Accept. The Government will write to the
Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) and the FRC about this
recommendation. |
|
Recommendation 7 proposes that the accounting bodies
encourage their members to consult independent third parties or the UIG when
there is disagreement with company management about the interpretation or
application of accounting standards. |
Implementation of this recommendation is an
issue for the professional accounting bodies. The Government will draw this
recommendation to the attention of the accounting bodies. The Government will
consult the FRC and AASB regarding the role of the Urgent Issues Group (UIG) |
|
Recommendation 8 proposes amendments to accounting
standard AASB 1023 Financial
Reporting of General Insurance Activities to correct a number of
deficiencies that were identified in the standard. |
The AASB’s current work program provides for
a revision of AASB 1023 as part of the program to converge Australian standards
with standards issued by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). The AASB will be requested to
consider the terms of recommendation 8 as it continues to work with the IASB in
finalising the international standard on insurance
contracts. |
|
Recommendation 9 proposes that a standard of
independence for auditors should be contained in legislation and professional
standards. |
Accept. This recommendation is being
implemented under the CLERP 9 process. |
|
Recommendation 10 proposes that the
Corporations Act should be amended to require the board to provide a statement
in the annual report that identifies all non-audit services provided by the
audit firm and the fees applicable to each item of work and explains why those
non-audit services do not compromise audit
independence. |
Accept. This recommendation is being
implemented under the CLERP 9
process. |
|
Recommendation 11 proposes that the CLERP 9
proposal for a “waiting period” of 2 years before a former partner directly
involved in the audit of a client as a director or in senior management be
extended. |
Accept. This recommendation is being
implemented under the CLERP 9
process. |
|
Recommendation 12 proposes that the CLERP 9
proposal for rotation of the lead engagement partner and review partner be
extended to key senior audit personnel. |
CLERP 9 requires rotation of lead engagement
and review partners after 5 years. It is these audit partners who are
responsible for forming the final opinion on the financial statements of the
client. In these circumstances, the Government does not consider that extending
the rotation requirement to parties subordinate to the lead engagement and
review partners will enhance auditor
independence. |
|
Recommendation 13 proposes changes to the
content of the audit report and the inclusion of an audited operating and
financial review in the annual report. |
The Auditing and Assurance Standards Board
(AuASB) will be consulted about the proposals for the audit report to contain
comment on alternative accounting treatments, disclosure regarding significant
matters arising in the audit
process and for audit reports to be presented in plain English. These
requirements are better suited for inclusion in the auditing standards rather
than as prescriptive legislative requirements. A requirement for an operating and financial review
(otherwise known as MD&A) is supported and it is intended that this be
included in the CLERP 9
legislation. As MD&A material is descriptive in nature, it does not
readily lend itself to audit processes. |
|
Recommendation 14 proposes that the
Corporations Act be amended to require listed companies to include a brief summary
of the nature and scope of the audit services provided by their
auditor each year. |
This requirement is better suited for
inclusion in the auditing standards rather than being prescribed in legislation.
The AuASB will be consulted concerning an amendment to the relevant auditing
standard. |
|
Recommendation 15 proposes that both the
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)
and the Institute of Actuaries of Australia introduce compulsory
certification of the completeness and accuracy of
data. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA and
the Institute of Actuaries of Australia. |
|
Recommendation 16 proposes that the
Institute of Actuaries of Australia and the APRA
introduce a requirement for more detailed disclosure of the exercise,
incidence and impact of subjective judgment and departure from historical
experience. |
The Government will refer this recommendation to APRA
and the Institute of Actuaries of Australia. |
|
Recommendation 17 proposes that APRA
extend the qualifications of the approved actuary to require that
they not be an employee or partner of the organisation to which the approved
auditor belongs. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA
and the Institute of Actuaries of Australia. |
|
Recommendation 18 proposes changed
governance arrangements for APRA,
including, replacing the non-executive board with an executive group
comprising of a CEO and 2-3 commissioners and discontinuing the involvement of
representatives from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)
and the Reserve Bank of
Australia on the board of APRA. |
The Government has amended the APRA Act to implement an enhanced corporate
governance structure for APRA
that took effect from 1 July 2003. The new members and Chair and
Deputy Chair of APRA
commenced on 1 July 2003. |
|
Recommendation 19 proposes that the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
Act 1998 (APRA Act) be
amended to provide the chief executive with the power to establish an advisory
board. |
The Government supports this recommendation
and will recommend to APRA that an Advisory Board be
established. |
|
Recommendation 20 proposes that the direct
involvement of representatives of ASIC and the RBA in the governance of APRA be
discontinued. This will require amendment of the APRA Act. |
The Government has amended the APRA Act to implement an enhanced corporate governance
structure for APRA that took effect from 1 July 2003. The new members and Chair
and Deputy Chair of APRA
commenced on 1 July 2003. Representation of the Australian Securities and
Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Reserve Bank of Australia in the governance of
APRA
has been discontinued. |
|
Recommendation 21 proposes that the APRA
chief executive urgently instigates a review of APRA’s
organisational structure, balancing its cross-sectoral
responsibilities with accountability and knowledge of financial
services. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APU
for its action. |
|
Recommendation 22 proposes that the
Commonwealth Government consider removing the requirement for the Treasurer’s
agreement to operational decisions involving APRA’s prudential oversight of
general insurers. |
The Government accepts the policy intent
of this recommendation and will
remove the requirement for APRA to seek the Treasurer’s agreement to make
operational decisions which do not involve wider policy
issues. |
|
Recommendation 23 proposes the Government
review the inconsistencies between the legislative provisions for merit review
under the Insurance Act 1973
and the Banking Act 1959.
|
The Government accepts this recommendation.
|
|
Recommendation 24
proposes that APRA implement a programme to build the skills of staff
involved in the supervision of general insurers. This should involve a review of
its human resource management policies to assess APRA’s
competitiveness in the financial services sector labour market. The
review should take account of the adequacy of remuneration, training and career
structures as well as other steps to increase APRA’s
attractiveness as an employer. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA
for its action. |
|
Recommendation 25
proposes the Government adopt a three-year rolling fund arrangement
to set APRA’s
budget. |
This already occurs
in practice under existing funding
arrangements. |
|
Recommendation 26
proposes that APRA
develop a more sceptical, questioning and, where necessary, aggressive
approach to its prudential supervision of general insurers. Consultation,
inquiry and constructive dialogue should be balanced by firmness in its
requirements and a preparedness to enforce compliance with applicable standards.
In particular, APRA
should take a firm
approach to ensuring
regulated entities’ timely compliance in the lodging of returns and the
provision of information. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 27 proposes that APRA
continue to develop and review processes, guidelines and training to
assist its staff in considering the appropriate approach to take towards
supervised entities in different situations. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its action. |
|
Recommendation 28
proposes that APRA develop systems to encourage its staff and management
continually to question their assumptions, views and conclusions about the
financial viability of supervised entities, particularly on the receipt of new
information about an entity. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 29
proposes that APRA develop an internal system for tracking all relevant
information concerning regulated entities. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 30
proposes that APRA develop mechanisms to investigate the reinsurance
arrangements for general insurers on a random but frequent
basis. |
The
Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA
for its action. |
|
Recommendation 31
proposes that the effectiveness of the current memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between APRA and ASIC be reviewed; the processes for
liaison, coordination and exchange of information between APRA and ASIC should be reviewed on a
regular basis; to facilitate the exchange of information, the Commonwealth
Government should make a regulation specifying ASIC for the purposes of
s.56(5)(a) the APRA
Act. The
Government has already implemented enhanced exchange of information arrangements
between APRA and
ASIC through recent amendments to the APRA Act. ASIC is specified for the purposes
of the APRA Act. |
The
Government will refer the responsibility for reviewing the existing memorandum
of understanding (MOU) between APRA and ASIC to APRA for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 32
proposes that matters relating to the coordination of Commonwealth
regulation affecting the insurance industry be the province of the Commonwealth Treasury. |
Accept.
This already occurs in practice. Treasury will continue to facilitate ongoing
liaison, coordination and exchange of information between
regulators. |
|
Recommendation 33
proposes that coordination of matters related to the regulation of the
insurance industry be addressed through the proposed ministerial council (see
recommendation 54 below). |
Accept.
Since March 2002 the
Commonwealth has regularly convened a meeting of Commonwealth and State and
Territories Insurance Ministers to discuss insurance matters generally. The
forum will continue to consider insurance matters as they
arise. |
|
Recommendations 34
deals with the disclosure of information by authorised general
insurers. |
The
Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its action. |
|
Recommendation 35 proposes that information that
enables external users to make an
informed assessment of an insurer’s outstanding claims provisions and
reinsurance arrangements be published by the insurer or APRA. APRA
should develop reporting returns for insurers that would enable this to occur if existing returns are
insufficient. |
The Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 36
proposes that insurers be required to make greater disclosure of
qualitative information relating to their risk and reinsurance management
strategies. Other qualitative information - where the prospect of disclosure may
affect the quality of information provided to companies - need not be
disclosed. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 37
proposes that APRA
identify which regulatory activities should be disclosed publicly and by
what means. |
The
Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its action. |
|
Recommendation 38
proposes that APRA develop and promulgate a standard for the effective
regulation of authorised insurers that operate as part of a corporate
group. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its action. |
|
Recommendation 39 proposes that APRA
monitor the financial condition of corporate groups, including those
with foreign operations. Pending the development of the proposed prudential
standard on supervision of corporate groups, APRA should use existing powers to
require groups to provide any information it considers necessary to perform this
role. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to APRA for its action. |
|
Recommendation 40
proposes that APRA take steps to ensure that it effectively exchanges
with relevant foreign regulators information and intelligence on the operations
of Australian insurers with international operations. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 41
proposes that APRA modify the prudential standards to require the annual
production by an authorised general insurer’s approved actuary of a report on the overall financial
condition of the insurer. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to APRA for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 42
proposes that the Commonwealth Government amend the Insurance Act 1973 to extend
prudential regulation to all discretionary insurance-like products - to the
extent that it is possible to do so within constitutional
limits. |
The
Government will commission a review to examine the role of discretionary mutual
funds in the insurance market. The review will also include an examination of
the role of direct offshore foreign insurers in the insurance market. Details of
the review including the terms of reference are available on the Treasury
website. |
|
Recommendation 43 proposes that the Corporations Act
be amended so that
the APRA
may apply to wind up a company that is an authorised insurer if any of
the criteria specified in s.52( l)(aa),
(ab) or (a) of the Insurance
Act 1973 are met. |
The Government accepts this
recommendation. |
|
Recommendation 44
proposes that the Corporations Act be amended to specify that the
interests of policyholders are interests to which the court should have regard
in deciding whether to make a winding-up order. |
The
Government accepts this recommendation and notes this already occurs in
practice. |
|
Recommendations 45
proposes that the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) amend Listing Rule 3.1 to require-or publish a guidance
note making it clear-that price-sensitive announcements have the approval of
either the board or a delegate of the board subject to ratification by the
board. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to the Australian Stock Exchange for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 46 proposes that the ASX amend the
Listing Rules to prohibit
‘blacklisting’ - defined as exclusion of a person or organisation from briefings
by a company or a pattern of such exclusion in the face of negative reports on
the company by those analysts over a specific period. |
The Government will refer this
recommendation to the Australian Stock Exchange for its
action. |
|
Recommendation 47
proposes that the ASX clarify Listing Rule 1 1.1, so that it applies to
any significant change in the business or assets of a listed company, whether it
be by acquisition, disposal, amalgamation or otherwise. Further, that the ASX
amend the Listing Rules to define 'significant change', so that it encompasses
financial and geographic factors as
well as the nature and scale of the company's business.
|
The
Government will refer this recommendation to the Australian Stock Exchange for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 48
proposes that the ASX amend Listing Rule 1 1.2, so that
it applies to any disposal of the whole or substantially the whole of the assets
or operations of a listed company. |
The
Government will refer this recommendation to the Australian Stock Exchange for
its action. |
|
Recommendation 49
proposes that MR4 should
become the sole prudential regulator of general
insurance. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their consideration.
|
|
Recommendation 50 is that if the States and Territories remain
involved with prudential regulation, that there be effective information
exchange with APRA. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their consideration.
|
|
Recommendations 51-52
propose that the States and Territories reduce inconsistencies in their
statutory schemes, and that they apply relevant prudential
requirements. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their consideration.
|
|
Recommendation 53
proposes that the States and Territories consider allowing greater price
flexibility in their statutory schemes. This is a matter that would be
appropriate for consideration by the proposed ministerial
council. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their
consideration. |
|
Recommendation 54
recommends that the Commonwealth use a ministerial council to discuss and
resolve general insurance and perhaps other financial services matters with the
States. |
Accept. Since March 2002 the Commonwealth
has convened a meeting of
Commonwealth and State and
Territories Insurance Ministers to discuss insurance matters generally.
The forum will continue to consider insurance matters as they
arise. |
|
Recommendation 55 is
that the States and Territories abolish stamp duty on general insurance
products. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their
consideration. |
|
Recommendation 56 is
that those States and Territories that have not already done so abolish fire
services levies on insurers. |
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their
consideration. |
|
Recommendation 57 is that the States and Territories exclude the cost
of the GST for the purposes of calculating stamp duties or any other state or
territory levies that are imposed on insurance premiums.
|
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their consideration.
|
|
Recommendation 58 is that governments avoid imposing
on insurers levies and other taxes that cannot be passed on to policyholders.
|
The Commonwealth will refer this
recommendation to the States and Territories for their
consideration. |
|
Recommendation 59
is that the Income Tax
Assessment Act (ITAA) 1936 be amended to align it with
the modified accounting standards proposed. |
Australia is committed to adopting
international accounting standards and considers it appropriate to await consideration
by the AASB of recommendation
8 to examine the behavioural
impacts arising from any new
model before aligning the taxation treatment of general insurers with their
accounting treatment. |
|
Recommendation 60 is to amend the law to make contributions to
catastrophe reserves tax deductible, and releases assessable for tax.
|
Australia is committed to adopting
international accounting standards and considers it appropriate to await
consideration by the IASB of the
arrangements. |
|
Recommendation 61
recommends the Commonwealth Government introduce a systematic scheme to support
policy holders of insurance companies in the event of a
failure. |
This
matter was last considered under the Financial System Inquiry (the Wallis Inquiry) which
recommended against establishing such a scheme. The Government has commissioned
a study by an eminent person into the merits of financial system guarantees. The
study will include how any guarantee might be funded and how it might impact on
consumers and incentives in financial markets. Details of the study including
the terms of reference and how the study will be conducted are available on the
Treasury website. |
(F) 2003
US BOARD OF DIRECTORS GOVERNANCE AND REMUNERATION SURVEY
A new survey has examined trends in operational and remuneration practices of boards of directors of large US companies. Buck Consultants has released its survey of 166 US companies with median revenue of US$1.1 billion.
In relation to board and committee practices, the survey found: 46% had recently restructured their committee membership with another 16% considering doing this; 42% had recently sought new board members with specific expertise with another 24% considering doing this; 43% had recently hired outside/independent consultants to assist the board with another 11% considering doing this; 39% had recently increased the number of meetings for committees of the board with another 11% considering doing this; 33% had recently implemented holding meetings without management present with another 14% considered doing this; 18% had recently implemented providing director education with another 17% considering doing this; and 8% had recently implemented increasing the number of meetings for full board with another 9% considering doing this.
Interlocking boards (where an executive of A serves on the board of company B, and an executive of B serves on the board of company A) have declined significantly, with only 10% of the companies surveyed indicating any remaining interlocks.
The combined role of Chairman of the Board and CEO remains common in US companies. Only 28% of the companies surveyed have a non-employee chairman although this is a reduction.
While a formal evaluation of non-executive board members is considered good practice, only 17% of the companies surveyed conducted them and, of those, only 7% actually tie pay to the performance evaluation's results.
In relation to 2003 remuneration practices, payment of cash retainers for directors remains the most prevalent form of compensation, with 91% of respondents paying them. Of the companies that pay retainers, 76% pay the entire retainer in cash, while others pay retainers in varying combinations of cash, equity and stock options. In relation to the median annual cash retainer, for companies with annual revenues greater than $US10 billion the median annual cash retainer was $US50,000, for companies with annual revenues between $1 billion and $10 billion, the retainer was $35,000, for companies with annual revenues between $500 million and $1 billion, the retainer was $30,000, for companies with annual revenues between $100 million and $500 million, the retainer was $20,000 and for companies with annual revenues less than $100 million, the retainer was $17,500. 69% of companies pay directors a per-meeting fee on top of the annual retainer (typically in the range of $1,000 to $1,500 per meeting).
The use of stock options remains a popular form of remuneration with the number of stock options granted to directors upon their initial election to the board tending to be inversely proportional to the company's size. The smallest companies in the study granted a median of 25,000 options while the largest companies granted 15,000 options. The number of stock options granted annually to directors ranged from 3,000 to 10,000 (with smaller companies offering more options).
A key finding is that equity remuneration, even during a weak stock market, still provides at least half of most directors' total remuneration. The value of annual grants ranges from $43,000 to $65,500 (using the Black-Scholes valuation model).
In relation to total remuneration, the median total remuneration paid to directors in 2003 ranges from $72,500 for companies with revenues between $100 million and $500 million to $127,900 for companies with revenues of more than $10 billion.
Further details of the study are on the Buck Consultants website at http://www.buckconsultants.com/
(G) REHABILITATING LARGE AND COMPLEX ENTERPRISES IN FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES
On 12 September 2003, the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee published a Discussion Paper on rehabilitating large and complex enterprises in financial difficulties.
This Paper was developed in response to a request from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, Senator the Hon Ian Campbell, to consider whether the Australian voluntary administration (VA) provisions, in force since 1993, are suitable for handling the rehabilitation of large and complex enterprises. The issues the Senator asked the Committee to consider include:
· possible changes to the
VA provisions to better accommodate large corporate recovery cases;
·
possible changes to the scheme of arrangement provisions to accommodate these
cases; and
· whether a new system for corporate recovery, along the lines of
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, should be adopted.
In releasing the Paper, the Convenor of the Advisory Committee, Richard St John, said:
"The financial failure of any company can have severe repercussions for its creditors, employees, suppliers, customers and shareholders. Processes that allow the prospects of recovery to be fully explored stand to benefit all these parties and the economy generally. This is especially the case with large and complex enterprises, where the rehabilitation challenges may be magnified."
The Discussion Paper looks at key areas that affect the likelihood of corporate recovery:
· Early remedial action.
The earlier a financially distressed company responds to its financial
difficulties, and enters into discussions with its major creditors; the better
may be its prospects of successful rehabilitation.
· Ongoing financing. A
company may have a better chance of successful recovery if it can obtain new
loan or equity finance during the rehabilitation period.
· Flexible
timetable. The recovery procedure timetable needs to be sufficiently flexible to
adjust to the needs of particular companies.
The Paper compares the debtor?driven US Chapter 11 with the more creditor?oriented Australian VA procedure in each of these areas. Some of the key differences are:
· the US system leaves the
board of directors in control while, under VA, the company is run by an external
administrator.
· the rights of all creditors are frozen under the US system,
whereas some creditors in Australia can enforce their rights regardless of a
VA.
· the US system has special priority rules aimed at encouraging ongoing
funding of a company in rehabilitation. The VA procedure is more protective of
the rights of existing creditors.
The Paper also:
· Discusses recent changes
in the UK that greatly restrict the rights of holders of floating charges to
bypass the administration procedure by appointing a receiver over the company's
assets. There is no equivalent restriction in Australia.
· Looks at issues
under the current VA provisions, including:
· whether to
retain voting of creditors by number as well as by value and, if so, whether the
administrator should continue to have the casting vote in the event of any
deadlock between number and value;
· whether to exempt
equity?for?debt swaps from the prospectus disclosure requirements and the
takeover provisions; and
· whether there should be further
provision for dealing collectively with companies in a corporate group.
·
Identifies problems with using creditors' schemes of arrangement as an
alternative form of corporate revival. A key problem with schemes is the
continuing liability of directors for insolvent trading.
Copies of the Discussion Paper are available on the CAMAC website at http://www.camac.gov.au
The Advisory Committee invites submissions by Friday 28 November 2003.
For further information
contact:
John Kluver
Executive Director
Telephone: 02 9911 2950
(H) DIVIDEND
REINVESTMENT PLANS CONTINUE TO GROW
On 11 September 2003, KPMG
Corporate Finance released a study showing that dividend reinvestment plans
(DRPs) continued to grow in popularity in 2002-03 in Australia, raising almost
30% more capital for listed companies than the total of all Initial Public
Offers.
The study found that listed companies raised $4.3 billion from
dividend reinvestment plans in the year to 30 June 2003. This was 30% more than
the total of $3.2 billion raised by all IPOs over the same period. Lower share
prices meant the total amount raised by dividend reinvestment plans decreased
slightly in 2002-03 compared to the previous year. However, DRPs grew in
popularity with investors, with the number of DRP share issues increasing by 11%
from 314 in 2001-02 to 350 in 2002-03.
Five year history of
capital raised - DRPs versus IPOs
|
|
1999 |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
|
Number of DRP
issues |
323 |
299 |
302 |
314 |
350 |
|
Total raised by DRPs ($m)
|
$3,630 |
$3,850 |
$3,912 |
$4,630 |
$4,298 |
|
DRP value as a % of all raisings through ASX
|
14% |
12% |
14% |
18% |
17% |
|
Number of IPOs |
49 |
161 |